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CHAPTER 3 
Conflict of Laws 
FRANCIS J. NICHOLSON, S.J. 
§3.1. Jurisdiction for divorce: Domicile in state of rendition a 
prerequisite. By traditional legal doctrine, a marriage creates a status 
which, viewed as a res, has its situs at the domicile of the married 
parties. Under this theory, a divorce action to terminate a status-res 
was considered as an action in rem which had to be brought at the 
situs, that is, the domicile. If a divorce were granted by a state where 
both husband and wife were domiciled, the decree was valid and 
entitled to full faith and credit everywhere.1 There was likewise no 
jurisdictional difficulty when the forum state was the domicile of only 
one spouse. The United States Supreme Court, in the first Wiliams 
case,2 expressly overruled its earlier Haddock decision3 and held that 
the domicile of one spouse alone was an adequate jurisdictional basis 
for a valid divorce, which had to be accorded full faith and credit.4 
The second Williams case, 5 however, declared that collateral attack 
on the finding of domicile in the ex parte decree was permitted to 
ascertain whether the spouse securing the ex parte divorce was a 
bona fide domiciliary of the state granting it. This ruling was consistent 
with the traditional view that, if a court purported to grant a divorce 
in a state which was not the domicile of either spouse, the decree was 
not entitled to full faith and credit anywhere.6 
In Ragucci v. Ragucci,7 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
reaffirmed its adherence to the traditional theory that the state which 
FRANCIS J. NICHOLSON, S.J., is Professor of Law at Boston College Law School 
and a member of the District of Columbia and Massachusetts Bars. 
§3.1. 1 Restatement of Conflict of Laws Second §70 (Proposed Official Draft 
Pt. 1, 1967). 
2 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942). 
3 Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906). 
4 See Restatement of Conflict of Laws Second §71 (Proposed Official Draft 
Pt. 1, 1967); Barnard v. Barnard, 331 Mass. 455, 120 N.E.2d 187 (1954). 
5 Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945). 
6 Restatement of Conflict of Laws Second §72 (Proposed Official Draft Pt. 1, 
1967). On the question of validity under the due process clause as opposed to 
the issue of full faith and credit, the United States Supreme Court has never 
had occasion to determine whether the domicile of at least one spouse in the 
divorce state is an essential jurisdictional basis for the granting of a divorce. 
Domicile of at least one spouse was held a necessary jurisdictional basis in 
Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953), vacated as moot, 347 U.S. 610 (1954). 
7 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 487, 258 N.E.2d 28. 
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is not the domicile of the libellant lacks jurisdiction to grant a divorce. 
In Ragucci, the wife filed a petition for separate support against her 
husband in a Massachusetts probate court.s The husband and wife 
were married in Italy while the husband was visiting there from the 
United States. Shortly thereafter, by mutual consent, the husband 
returned alone to Massachusetts and the wife remained in Italy. In 
the following year, a son was born to them. Neither the wife nor the 
child ever came to Massachusetts. 
Several years later, the husband executed a complaint for divorce in 
Nevada. He alleged that he had been domiciled in Nevada for more 
than six weeks immediately before suit was brought and intended to 
make Nevada his home for an indefinite period of time. The complaint 
stated, as grounds for the suit, that the parties had lived separate and 
apart for more than three years. Service was made by publishing and 
mailing the summons and a copy of the complaint to the wife in Italy, 
but she never received them. The wife did not appear personally in 
the Nevada proceedings and was defaulted. The husband left Nevada 
on the day he obtained his divorce and returned to Massachusetts, 
where he resumed residence and subsequently married another woman. 
In his findings, the probate judge stated that he was unable to find 
that the Nevada court did not have jurisdiction to enter the divorce 
decree and, hence, that the Nevada decree was entitled to full faith 
and credit in Massachusetts. Since a jurisdictional prerequisite to a 
decree for separate support in Massachusetts was that the parties be 
married,9 and since, at the time the petition for support was filed 
and heard, the marriage had been dissolved by the Nevada divorce, 
the probate court judge dismissed the wife's petition. 
On appeal, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the 
decisive question was whether the Nevada decree of divorce was valid, 
and that the answer depended upon whether the husband had acquired 
a domicile in Nevada.10 The Court assumed that the probate judge, in 
stating that he was unable to find that the Nevada court did not have 
jurisdiction, was giving the Nevada decree a presumption of validity. 
This presumption was required by the criteria established by the 
United States Supreme Court in the second Williams case.U An exam-
ination of the evidence showed, however, that this presumption was 
clearly rebutted. The husband had testified in the probate court that 
the reason he went to Nevada was to get a quick divorce there. This 
action was taken after he had obtained legal advice. He had lived in 
Massachusetts for eight years before his trip to Reno and, after satis-
fying the Nevada residence requirements and obtaining his divorce, he 
returned immediately to Massachusetts. The Supreme Judicial Court 
8 G.L., c. 209, §32. 
9 Welker v. Welker, 325 Mass. 738, 92 N.E.2d 373 (1950). 
10 See Barnard v. Barnard, 331 Mass. 455, 120 N.E.2d 187 (1954). 
11 Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945). See Rubinstein v. Rubinstein, 
324 Mass. 340, 86 N.E.2d 654 (1949). 
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found that the husband did not acquire a domicile in Nevada, and that 
Nevada lacked jurisdiction to grant him a divorce for that reason. The 
Court, therefore, reversed the decision of the probate court. 
There is growing dissatisfaction with the traditional view that 
domicile is the sole basis for divorce jurisdiction.12 Domicile, as the 
foundation for legal relationships between an individual and a state, 
is a highly artificial concept. In the area of divorce, it has frequently 
been the occasion of fraud and perjury. Statutes in a number of states 
allow the granting of a divorce on the basis of residence as distinguished 
from domicile. The most common type of statute is one which permits 
the granting of a divorce to military personnel who have been con-
tinuously stationed in the state for a given period, usually a year.13 
This development is not aimed at abandoning domicile as a juris-
dictional basis for divorce; rather it suggests the recognition of addi-
tional bases for jurisdiction which conform to the needs of a modern, 
mobile society. 
But even in our advanced times, divorce is a matter of more than 
casual concern to the spouses and their children. Marriage is more than 
a contractual relationship; it is an important social institution in which 
the state where the husband and wife make their home has a particular 
interest. A divorce decree not only severs the personal relationship of 
husband and wife but also affects their economic relations, as by 
determining the extent to which one spouse must thereafter contribute 
to the other's support. An ex parte divorce suit, as in Ragucci where 
the wife had no knowledge of the Nevada proceedings, often fails to 
protect the interests of the absent spouse. The husband in Ragucci had 
no connection with Nevada, domiciliary or otherwise, that would have 
made it reasonable for that state to dissolve the marriage. The Supreme 
Judicial Court's reliance on the traditional domicile theory in Ragucci 
demonstrates that this basis for divorce jurisdiction is still useful for 
promoting justice in the context of "quickie" ex parte proceedings. 
§3.2. Inter vivos trust of movables: Law of place of administration 
governs validity of exercise of power of appointment. In New En-
gland Merchants National Bank of Boston v. Mahoney} the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts applied the usual conflict of laws rule 
that the validity of a trust of movables created inter vivos is governed 
by the law of the state where the trust is to be administered. 
The settlor of the trust in question was domiciled in Florida when 
the trust was created, and died a domiciliary of that state. The trust 
instrument was held in Massachusetts by a Massachusetts corporate 
trustee, and it was duly executed in Massachusetts. The personal 
12 See R. Leflar, American Conflicts Law 543-547 (1968). 
13 See, e.g., Lauterbach v. Lauterbach, 392 P.2d 24 (Alaska 1964); Wood v. 
Wood, 159 Tex. 350, 320 S.W.2d 807 (1959); Wallace v. Wallace, 63 N.M. 414, 
!120 P.2d 1020 (1958); Craig v. Craig, 143 Kan. 624, 56 P.2d 464 (1936). 
§3.2. 1 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 103, 255 N.E.2d 592. 
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property composing the trust', was delivered to the trustee in Massa-
chusetts at the time of the creation of the trusts, and the trust res never 
left Massachusetts. Before his death, the settlor executed instruments, 
in accordance with the provisions of the trust, in which substitute 
distributees were named. 
Upon the termination of the trust, the settlor's nephew, one of the 
distributees named in the original trust indenture, claimed that the 
instruments naming the substitute distributees were obtained through 
undue influence, were invalid, and that, accordingly, he was entitled 
to distribution of his share of the property under the original trust. 
The corporate trustee petitioned a Massachusetts probate court for in-
structions concerning the distribution of the trust corpus. The probate 
court decreed that distribution should be made in accordance with 
the appointments executed by the settlor before his death. The 
nephew appealed. 
Initially, the Supreme Judicial Court had to decide whether the 
law of Massachusetts or the law of Florida was to govern. The usual 
choice of law rule pertaining to the validity of an inter vivos trust of 
movable property is that validity is determined by the law of the state 
of administration, in the absence of a designation by the settlor that 
the law of a particular state should control.2 Likewise, the validity of 
the exercise of a power of appointment under an inter vivos trust is 
determined by the law which governs the validity of the trust.3 
The settlor in the present case had not designated the law of a 
particular state to control validity of the trust. He was a domiciliary of 
Florida, but all the relevant factors pertaining to the creation and ad-
ministration of the trust were related to Massachusetts. Hence, the 
Court found that the settlor intended the trust to be administered in 
Massachusetts.4 The question of the validity of the exercise of the power 
of appointment, therefore, had to be determined by Massachusetts law.5 
The Court, having disposed of the choice of law question, proceeded 
to consider, under apposite Massachusetts law, the appellant's conten-
tion that the power of appointment exercised by the settlor was invalid 
because of undue influence. It was well established that the contestant 
had the burden of proving undue influence.6 The appellant had not 
pointed to any special instances of undue influence. The record re-
vealed no evidence that any of the beneficiaries of the power exercised 
2 Restatement of Conflict of Laws Second §270 (Proposed Official Draft Pt. 3, 
1969); Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 315-319 (4th ed., Scoles, 1964); R. Leflar, Amer-
ican Conflicts Law 460-462 (1968); Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 391-397 (3d ed. 
1963). 
3 Restatement of Conflict of Laws Second §274 (Proposed Official Draft Pt. 3, 
1969). 
4 See Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Alfred Univ., 339 Mass. 82, 157 N.E.2d 
662 (1959); Amerige v. Attorney General, 324 Mass. 648, 88 N.E.2d 126 (1949). 
5 See Isaacson v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. 325 Mass. 469, 91 N.E.2d 334 
(1950); Greenough v. Osgood, 235 Mass. 235, 126 N.E. 461 (1920). 
6 See O'Brien v. Wellesley College, 346 Mass, ]621 19() N.E.2d 8'79 (1963). 
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by the settlor before his death had influenced his execution of that 
power. The Supreme Judicial Court held, therefore, that the settlor's 
exercise of the power of appointment was valid, and affirmed the 
decree of the probate court. 
It is obviously desirable that a trust estate of personal property be 
treated as a unit and, to this end, that all the movables in the trust be 
controlled by a single law. This is true whether the movables consist of 
chattels, rights embodied in a document, or intangibles, no matter 
where they happen to be when the trust is created. When the settlor 
does not designate a state whose law is to govern the validity of the 
inter vivos trust, the court will make the choice of law from among 
the states having connections with the trust. Ordinarily, the state where 
the settlor intended the trust to be administered will be deemed to be 
the state of most significant relationship with respect to the issue of 
validity. Its law should determine matters of validity, including the 
question of the validity of the exercise of the power of appointment 
contained in the trust instruments. 
It must be remembered, however, that one factor which the courts 
consider in selecting the state of the applicable law is whether ap-
plication of a particular law would result in sustaining the trust's 
validity. It is presumed that the settlor intended to execute a valid 
instrument. Consequently, an inter vivos trust will be upheld if valid 
under the law of the settlor's domicile, even though it would be invalid 
under the law of the state of administration.'~' The element of un-
certainty, more pronounced with respect to trusts than other areas of 
conflicts law, makes it desirable that the trust instrument clearly 
indicate what state's law is to govern validity. 
§3.3. Jurisdiction for adoption: Law of domiciliary state controls. 
In Adoptzon of a Minor, 1 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
sustained the exercise of jurisdiction in the matter of an adoption by a 
Massachusetts probate court. The case was an appeal by the father of a 
minor child from a decree of the probate court allowing adoption by 
the mother and stepfather, residents of Massachusetts, without the 
consent of the father. 
The appellant father and his former wife were married in North 
Carolina in 1958. The minor child, Deborah, was born in 1960, and 
the family lived together in North Carolina until the parents separated 
in September, 1963. Deborah stayed with her mother, who filed for 
divorce in North Carolina; the divorce was granted. The decree, which 
became final in November, 1965, made no provision for alimony, sup-
port of the child, or rights of custody or visitation. Deborah's father 
had agreed informally to provide $40 per month for her support. This 
arrangement continued until December, 1965, when the petitioners for 
T See Shannon v. Irving Trust Co., 275 N.Y. 95, 9 N.E.2d 792 (1937). 
§3.3. 1 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 765, 258 N.E.2d 567. 
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adoption were married in North Carolina and left immediately for 
Massachusetts. Thereafter the appellant paid no support for his 
daughter and did not communicate with her in any way. 
The principal argument of the appellant father was that Deborah 
remained a ward of the North Carolina court and could not be removed 
from the court's jurisdiction without its permission. Hence Deborah's 
removal from North Carolina was illegal. The Supreme Judicial Court 
noted, however, that the North Carolina court had made no order on 
the custody of the child who had been with her mother since Septem-
ber, 1963. Moreover, Deborah and her adopting parents had made 
their home in Massachusetts since December, 1965. The Court held, 
therefore, that the Massachusetts probate court had properly exercised 
jurisdiction in the case.2 
It should be noted that Massachusetts law requires written consent 
of the "lawful parents" in an adoption proceeding.3 Such written con-
sent is dispensed with, however, if the parent has neglected to provide 
proper care for the child.4 It was clear from the evidence that the 
father had shown no interest in Deborah from December, 1965, to the 
date of the filing of the petition for adoption. The Supreme Judicial 
Court, agreeing that the granting of the adoption was in the best in-
terests of the child, affirmed the decree of the probate court. 
One of the few problems in the area of adoption, so far as conflict of 
laws is concerned, is the judicial jurisdiction of a state to provide for 
an adoption. There are no choice of law problems since, in determining 
whether to grant the adoption, the forum will apply the local pro-
visions of its own law and not those of some other state. 
With respect to jurisdiction for adoption, it is generally recognized 
that such jurisdiction exists in a state (a) which is the domicile of either 
the child or the adoptive parent and (b) which has personal jurisdiction 
over the adoptive parent and the adopted child.5 Two main questions 
are involved in an adoption proceeding: whether the adoption is in 
the child's best interests and, if so, whether the would-be adopter is a 
desirable person from the child's point of view. Courts sitting in either 
the state of domicile of the child or in that of the adoptive parent are 
well situated to decide such issues. Where the child and adoptive 
parent are domiciled in the same state, as in Adoption of a Minor, its 
jurisdiction cannot be questioned. 
§3.4. Guest-host action: Law of state with most significant rela· 
tionship applies. In Beaulieu v. Beaulieu} the Supreme Judicial 
2 See G.L., c. 210 §1; c. 215, §3. 
3 G.L., c. 210, §2; Hathaway v. Rickard, 323 Mass. 501, 82 N.E.2d 881 (1948). 
4 Restatement of Conflict of Laws Second §78, comment d (Proposed Official 
Draft Pt. 1, 1967); R. Leflar, American Conflicts Law 580 (1968). 
5 Restatement of Conflict of Laws Second §78 (Proposed Official Draft Pt. 1, 
1967). 
§3.4. I-Me.-, 265 A.2d 610 (1970). 
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Court of Maine has added Maine to the growing list of states which 
have abandoned the traditional "place of impact" doctrine in favor of 
the "more significant contacts" rule in tort cases. 
The plaintiff in Beaulieu, while riding as a passenger in an auto-
mobile owned and operated by his father, sustained injuries in an 
accident in Massachusetts caused by his father's negligence. At the 
time of the accident the parties were domiciled in Maine, and they 
continued to reside in that state. The plaintiff, seeking compensation, 
brought an action in a Maine court against his father. The plaintiff 
conceded that his claim was not based upon any factual setting of 
gross negligence. The defendant father moved to dismiss on the ground 
that the law of Massachusetts, with its gross negligence standards in 
guest-host cases, determined the rights and liabilities of the parties. 
The case was reported without decision to the Supreme Judicial Court 
by the trial court. 
Before the Beaulieu decision, it was well-settled conflicts law in 
Maine that the right of the plaintiff to recover for personal injuries 
was controlled by the law of the place where the injuries were received.2 
It was also Maine law that a plaintiff's cause of action in guest cases 
was dependent upon proof of wrongful conduct amounting to no 
more than ordinary negligence.3 The law of Massachusetts provided 
that a guest had to establish gross negligence in order to recover from 
his host. 4 Thus, there was a clear conflict between the law of Maine 
and that of Massachusetts, and the choice of law question raised by 
the defendant's motion to dismiss in Beaulieu was which law governed. 
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court acknowledged that it had invari-
ab1y applied the law of the place of the injury as its conflict of laws 
rule in tort cases. This deference shown to the lex loci delicti by Maine 
law in the matter of guest-host suits was in accord with the traditional 
"vested rights" doctrine.5 Recent decisions from various jurisdictions, 
however, support the view that the choice of substantive conflicts law 
in guest-host cases is to be determined more logically by the "more 
significant contacts" rule.6 The Maine Supreme Judicial Court, taking 
note of this development, stated: 
... We must decide anew whether the traditional rule of lex 
loci delicti ... fully satisfies the present needs of a motoring society 
2 Winslow v. Tibbetts, 131 Me. 318, 162 A. 785 (1932). 
s Levesque v. Pelletier, 131 Me. 266, 161 A. 198 (1932). 
4Falden v. Crook, 342 Mass. 173, 172 N.E.2d 686 (1961); Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 
228 Mass. 487, 118 N.E. 168 (1917). 
5 See Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 168-169 (4th ed., Scoles, 1964); Sturn berg, 
Conflict of Laws 205-207 (3d ed. 1963). 
6See, e.g., Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 
(1969); Woodward v. Steward, 243 A.2d 917 (R.I. 1968); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 
351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 
N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). See also Restatement of Conflict of Laws Second §§145, l46 
(Proposed Official Draft Pt. 2, 1968). 
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accustomed to fast, frequent and distant travel and at the same 
time subjected to ever-increasing motor vehicle injuries and 
fatalities.7 
Among the objections to modification of the lex loci delicti doctrine 
is the stare decisis rule. The court, conceding the need for stability in 
the law, pointed out that adherence to established precedent should 
not be used to preclude change in legal rules required by the realities 
of modern automobile travel. Another relevant consideration was the 
court's interest in advancing its own state's governmental interests. The 
parties in the present case were domiciled in Maine, and their journey 
began and was to end in that state. The car presumably was registered, 
garaged and insured in Maine. In light of Maine's policy of imposing 
liability in the guest-host situation on a showing of ordinary negligence, 
it was perfectly clear that Maine had the only real interest in whether 
recovery of damages should be permitted in this suit between Maine 
citizens. Massachusetts, on the other hand, had no real concern in the 
application of its gross negligence rule here, where its on:ly connection 
with the transaction was the occurrence of an accident in the course 
of a short trip over its highways. 
Comparing the relative contacts and interests of Maine and Massa-
chusetts in this litigation respecting the issue of responsibllity of a host 
to his guest, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court concluded that Maine 
had the more substantial relationship to the parties and the occurrence 
and that Maine law applied to the case. The court added that earlier 
Maine tort-conflicts decisions which did not apply the most significant 
relationship rule were accordingly modified. It then remanded the 
case to the superior court for trial. 
Though the traditional "place of impact" rule was easy to apply, it 
ignored the purposes of the conflicting laws of the respective states and, 
thus, often failed to produce just results. Under the "sig:nificant rela-
tionship" approach, a court determines for itself relevant contacts for 
resolving choice of law problems. This more modern approach con-
cededly creates problems with respect to the certainty and predictability 
of legal rules, but it represents a more rational use of the judicial 
process. Maine has now joined New Hampshire and Rhode Island 
among the New England states which have abandoned the lex loci 
delicti doctrine for the "contacts" approach in tort-conflicts cases. 
§3.5. Liability insurance contract: Law of state with most signifi-
cant relationship governs the right of insurer to disclaim liability. 
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts has 
applied Massachusetts choice of law rules in Hart v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co.,1 an action in which a judgm.ent creditor 
7- Me.-, 265 A.2d 610, 613 (1970). 
§3.5. 1313 F. Supp. 289 (D. Mass. 1970). 
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sought to reach and apply the liability of the defendant insurer under a 
po,icy covering a judgment debtor's automobile. 
Prior to October 9, 1964, the defendant insurance company (State 
Farm), an Illinois corporation with its principal place of business in 
that state, issued a policy of liability insurance covering an automobile 
jointly owned by two residents of Illinois. On October 9, 1964, plaintiff 
Marilyn Hart, a resident of Massachusetts, was a passenger in the 
automobile when it became involved in a single-car accident in Massa-
chusetts, while the car was being operated by one of the insured, one 
Dimmick. Hart sustained personal injuries in the accident and there-
after brought an action in tort against Dimmick in a Massachusetts 
court. She recovered a default judgment against him. An execution 
issued against Dimmick in the amount of $12,058.47. Subsequently 
counsel for the plaintiff made demand on defendant State Farm for 
payment of this sum. When the demand was refused, the present 
diversity action was commenced in the federal district court. 
Since jurisdiction in this case was based upon diversity of citizenship, 
the district court noted initially that the Erie doctrine required it to 
apply the conflict of law rules that would be applied by Massachusetts 
courts.2 In view of the facts that both insureds were residents of Illinois, 
that State Farm was an Illinois corporation with a principal place of 
business in that state, and that the insurance contract was made and 
the policy issued in Illinois, the court ruled that, under Massachusetts 
choice of law principles, the right of defendant State Farm to disclaim 
under the policy was to be determined by reference to the law of 
Illinois. a 
At the trial in the federal district court, the plaintiff offered in 
evidence the execution issued by the state court and the liability in-
surance policy issued by the defendant, and rested. The remainder of 
the trial consisted of presentation of evidence on behalf of the de-
fendant, offered to support the defense of lack of cooperation on the 
part of Dimmick as grounds for defeating liability under the policy. 
After reviewing the evidence, the district court stated that there were 
two questions for resolution in the case: (I) did the insured's conduct 
constitute non-cooperation; and (2) if so, had the insurer waived that 
defense by failure to assert it properly? 
With respect to the issue of the insured's non-cooperation, the court 
asserted that it had been proved in the case that Dimmick failed to 
appear for depositions, that he made conflicting statements to the 
defendant's claims investigator, and that he failed to attend the trial. 
All three of these factors constituted a substantial and material lack 
2 See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. 
Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). 
a See Searls v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 316 Mass. 606, 56 N.E.2d 127 (1944). 
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of cooperation under the law of Illinois.4 Thus, defendant State Farm 
had the right to disclaim liability. With regard to the remaining issue 
of the waiver of the non-cooperation defense by State Farm, the court 
found that the defendant had given notice of withdrawal from the 
case to Dimmick in timely fashion as required by the law of Illinois,5 
and properly exercised its right to withdraw. The district court, ruling 
that the defendant State Farm had sustained its affirmative burden of 
establishing both the defense of non-cooperation and the nonwaiver 
thereof, gave judgment for the defendant. 
The court's opinion is significant with respect to the proper choice 
of law rules relating to the rights created by liability insurance con-
tracts. The generally accepted position, following the traditional lex 
loci contractus rule, has been that the validity, interpretation, and 
effect of an insurance contract are governed by the law of the place 
where it is made.6 The modern approach, which repudiates the 
mechanical use of the lex loci contractus, favors the application of the 
law of the state which has the most significant relationship with a 
contract in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.7 The 
particular application of the "significant relationship" rule pertaining / 
to liability insurance contracts is that the validity of such a contract 
and the rights created thereby are determined by the local law of the 
state which the parties understood was to be the principal location of 
the insured risk during the term of the policy.s The federal district 
court endorsed the "significant relationship" approach in the present 
case when it determined that Illinois had the important contacts with 
the contract and that Illinois law, therefore, was controlling. 
The parties to the liability insurance contract are intensely con-
cerned with the nature and extent of the insured risk and with the 
terms and conditions of the policy. A consideration of such contacts as 
the domicile of the insured, the location of the insured risk, the state 
of incorporation of the insurer, and the place of the making of the 
contract, is essential to a proper determination of the law which governs 
the rights of the parties to the insurance contract. It is submitted that 
the court's decision in the present case, giving full scope to the govern-
mental interest of Illinois in the transaction and in the parties, is an 
admirable example of modern conflicts law in operation. 
4 Gallaway v. Scliied, 73 Ill. App. 2d 116, 219' N.E.2d 718 (1966) (failure to 
appear for depositions); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Keller, 17 Ill. App. 2d 44, 149 N.E.2d 
482 (1958) (making of false statements); Mertes v. Ballard, 103 Ill. App. 2d 171, 
242 N.E.2d 905 (1968) (failure to appear at trial). 
5 Gibraltar Ins. Co. v. Varkalis, 115 Ill. App. 2d 130, 253 N.E.2d 605 (1969). 
6 See R. Leflar, American Conflicts Law 380-381 (1968). 
7 See Restatement of Conflict of Laws Second §§187, 188 (Proposed Official 
Draft Pt. 2, 1968). 
s Id. §193. 
10
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1970 [1970], Art. 6
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1970/iss1/6
